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Abstract—Secure multi-party computation is a central problem
in modern cryptography. An important sub-class of this are
problems of the following form: Alice and Bob desire to produce
sample(s) of a pair of jointly distributed random variables.
Each party must learn nothing more about the other party’s
output than what its own output reveals. To aid in this, they
have available a set up — correlated random variables whose
distribution is different from the desired distribution — as well
as unlimited noiseless communication. In this paper we present
an upperbound on how efficiently a given set up can be used to
produce samples from a desired distribution.
The key tool we develop is a generalization of the concept
of common information of two dependent random variables
[Ga´cs-Ko¨rner, 1973]. Our generalization — a three-dimensional
region — remedies some of the limitations of the original
definition which captured only a limited form of dependence.
It also includes as a special case Wyner’s common information
[Wyner, 1975]. To derive the cryptographic bounds, we rely on a
monotonicity property of this region: the region of the “views”
of Alice and Bob engaged in any protocol can only monotonically
expand and not shrink. Thus, by comparing the regions for the
target random variables and the given random variables, we
obtain our upperbound.
I. INTRODUCTION
Finding a meaningful definition for the “common informa-
tion” of a pair of dependent random variables X and Y has
received much attention starting from the 1970s [6], [16], [19],
[1], [21]. We propose a new measure — a three-dimensional
region — which brings out a detailed picture of the extent
of common information of a pair. This gives us an expressive
means to compare different pairs with each other, based on the
shape and size of their respective regions. We are motivated
by potential applications in cryptography, game theory, and
distributed control, besides information theory, where the role
of dependent random variables and common randomness is
well-recognized.
Suppose X = (X ′, Q) and Y = (Y ′, Q) where X ′, Y ′, Q
are independent. Then a natural measure of “common infor-
mation” of X and Y is H(Q). Both an observer of X and an
observer of Y may independently produce the common part
Q; and conditioned on Q, there is no “residual dependency,”
i.e., I(X;Y |Q) = 0. The definition of Ga´cs and Ko¨rner [6]
generalizes this to arbitrary X,Y (Fig. 1(a)): the two observers
now see Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y n = (Y1, . . . , Yn), resp.,
where (Xi, Yi) pairs are independent drawings of (X,Y ).
They are required to produce random variables W1 = f1(Xn)
and W2 = f2(Y n), resp., which agree (with high probability).
The largest entropy rate (i.e., entropy normalized by n) of such
a “common” random variable was proposed as the common
information of X and Y . However, in the same paper [6],
Ga´cs and Ko¨rner showed (a result later strengthened by
Witsenhausen [16]) that this rate is still just the largest H(Q)
for Q such that X and Y can be written as (X ′, Q) and (Y ′, Q)
respectively.1 In other words, this definition captures only an
explicit form of common information in (a single instance of)
(X,Y ).
One limitation of the common information defined by Ga´cs
and Ko¨rner is that it ignores information which is almost
common. Our approach could be viewed as a strict generaliza-
tion of theirs which uncovers extra layers of “almost common
information.” Technically, we introduce an omniscient genie
who has access to both the observations X and Y and
can send separate messages to the two observers over rate-
limited noiseless links. See Fig. 1(b). The objective is for
the observers to agree on a “common” random variable as
before, but now with the genie’s assistance. This leads to a
trade-off region trading-off the rates of the noiseless links and
the resulting common information2 (or the resulting residual
dependency). We characterize these trade-off regions and show
that, in general, they exhibit non-trivial behavior, but reduce
to the trivial behaviour discussed above when the rates of the
noiseless links are zero.
Our new measure has an immediate application to cryptog-
raphy (Section III). Distributed random variables with non-
trivial correlations form an important resource in the crypto-
graphic task of secure multi-party computation. A fundamental
problem here is for two parties to “securely generate” a
certain pair of random variables, given another pair of random
variables, by means of a protocol. We show that the region
of residual dependency of the views of two parties engaged
in such a protocol can only monotonically expand and not
shrink. Thus, by comparing the regions for the target random
variables and the given random variables, we obtain improved
upperbounds on the efficiency with which one pair can be used
to securely generate another pair.
1Hence, after removing the maximal such Q, the contribution to the com-
mon information from X′ and Y ′ is zero, even if they are highly correlated.
Other approaches which do not necessarily suffer from this drawback have
been suggested, notably [19], [1], [21].
2We use the term common information primarily to maintain continuity
with [6].
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Fig. 1: Setup for (a) Ga´cs-Ko¨rner common information, and
(b) assisted common information.
II. ASSISTED COMMON INFORMATION REGION
A. Characterization
We say that a rate pair (R1, R2) enables a common infor-
mation rate RCI if for every  > 0, there is a large enough
integer n and (deterministic) functions fk : Xn × Yn →
{1, . . . , 2n(Rk+)}, (k = 1, 2), g1 : Xn×{1, . . . , 2n(R1+)} →
Z, and g2 : Yn × {1, . . . , 2n(R2+)} → Z (where Z is the set
of integers) such that
Pr (g1(X
n, f1(X
n, Y n)) 6= g2(Y n, f2(Xn, Y n))) ≤ , (1)
1
n
I(Xn, Y n; g1(X
n, f1(X
n, Y n))) ≥ RCI − . (2)
We denote the closure of the set of all rate pairs which enable
a common information rate RCI by RCI(RCI). We call this
the rate-region for enabling a common information rate of
RCI. Note that the largest value of RCI we need consider is
H(X,Y ). For larger values of RCI, RCI(RCI) is clearly empty.
Similarly, we define the rate-region RRD(RRD) for enabling
a residual dependency rate of RRD as the closure of the set of
all rate pairs which enable a residual dependency rate RRD,
where the definition of what it means for a rate pair to enable
a residual dependency rate RRD is exactly as above except (2)
is replaced by
1
n
I(Xn;Y n|g1(Xn, f1(Xn, Y n))) ≤ RRD + .
We also define the following “single-letter” regions
R?CI(RCI) = {(I(Y ;Q|X), I(X;Q|Y )) : I(X,Y ;Q) ≥ RCI} ,
(3)
R?RD(RRD) = {(I(Y ;Q|X), I(X;Q|Y )) : I(X;Y |Q) ≤ RRD} .
(4)
Here Q is any random variable dependent on (X,Y ).
The main result of this section is a characterization of the
rate-regions defined above(proof is sketched in section II-F):
Theorem 2.1:
RCI = R?CI, (5)
RRD = R?RD. (6)
Further, the cardinality of the alphabet Q of Q in (3)-(4) can
be restricted to |X ||Y|+ 2.
B. Behavior at R1 = R2 = 0 and Connection to Ga´cs-
Ko¨rner [6]
As discussed in the introduction, Ga´cs-Ko¨rner showed that
when there is no genie, the common information rate is zero
unless X = (X ′, Q), Y = (Y ′, Q), and H(Q) > 0. Since
the absence of links from the genie is a more restrictive
condition than zero-rate links from the genie, we can ask
whether introducing an omniscient genie, but with zero-rate
links to the observers, changes the conclusion of Ga´cs-Ko¨rner.
The corollary below answers this question in the negative. Also
note that the result of Ga´cs-Ko¨rner can be obtained as a simple
consequence of this corollary.
Let RCI-0 = sup {RCI : (0, 0) ∈ RCI(RCI)}, and
RRD-0 = inf {RRD : (0, 0) ∈ RRD(RRD)}.
Corollary 2.2: RCI-0 > 0 (or, RRD-0 < I(X;Y )) only if
there are X ′, Y ′, Q′ such that X = (X ′, Q′), Y = (Y ′, Q′),
RCI-0 = H(Q
′), and RRD-0 = I(X;Y |Q′).
Proof sketch.: We first observe that the only Q’s allowed
in (3) and (4) if the rate pair (0, 0) is a member are such
that I(Q;Y |X) = I(Q;X|Y ) = 0. Thus, the joint p.m.f. of
X,Y,Q has the form
p(x, y, q) = p(x, y)p(q|x) = p(x, y)p(q|y).
Hence, for all (x, y) such that p(x, y) > 0, we must have
p(q|x) = p(q|y), ∀q. This implies that, if we consider the
bipartite graph with vertices in X ∪ Y and an edge between
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y if and only if p(x, y) > 0, for all vertices
in the same connected component, p(q|vertex) is the same.
Using this, and defining Q′ to be the connected component to
which X (or, equivalently Y ) belongs, we can show that
I(X,Y ;Q) = I(Q′;Q) ≤ H(Q′),
I(X;Y |Q) = H(Q′|Q) + I(X;Y |Q′) ≥ I(X;Y |Q′).
If there is only one connected component, this implies that
RCI-0 = 0 and RRD-0 = I(X;Y ). Hence, if RCI-0 > 0 (or,
RRD-0 < I(X;Y )), more than one connected component must
exist; moreover RCI-0 = H(Q′) and RRD-0 = I(X;Y |Q′).
Thus, at zero rates, common information exhibits trivial
behavior. However, for positive rates, the behavior is, in gen-
eral, non-trivial. Presently, we will demonstrate this through
a few examples. But before that, we will show that Wyner’s
common information can also be obtained as a special case of
our characterization.
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Fig. 2: An achievable trade-off between R1 = R2 = R and RCI
(also RRD) for jointly Gaussian X,Y of unit variance and correlation
ρ = 0.95. The trade-off is obtained by choosing Q in (3) and (4) to
be the optimal jointly Gaussian choice. The optimal RCI is at least
as much as shown and the optimal RRD is at most what is shown.
Note that RCI is strictly positive for all R > 0.
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Fig. 3: U, V are binary random variables with joint p.m.f. p(0, 0) =
p(1, 1) = p, p(1, 0) = 1−2p, and p(0, 1) = 0. Boundary of RRD(0)
for p = 1/3 is shown. The marked point is the minimum sum-rate
point.
C. Connection to Wyner’s Common Information [19]
Wyner offered an alternative definition for common infor-
m tion in [19]. Briefly, Wyner’s common information is the
“minimum binary rate of the common input to two inde-
pendent processors that generate an approximation to X,Y .”
From [19], Wyner’s common information is
CWyner = inf I(X,Y ;U),
where the infimum is taken over U such that X − U − Y is
a Markov chain. It is easy to show that CWyner ≥ I(X;Y ).
Wyner’s common information can be obtained as a special
case of our characterization: (proof omitted due to space
constraints)
Corollary 2.3:
CWyner − I(X;Y ) = min
(R1,R2)∈RRD(0)
R1 +R2.
D. Non-Trivial Behavior at Non-Zero Rates
Example 2.1: Jointly Gaussian random variables. We con-
sider jointly Gaussian3 X,Y each of unit variance and with
correlation coefficient ρ. Let the rates of the links from the
genie to the two observers be the same, R1 = R2 = R.
3While the discussion has been for discrete random variables, it extends
directly to continuous random variables.
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Fig. 4: X,Y are dependent random variables whose joint p.m.f is
shown. The solid lines each carry a probability mass of 1−δ
8
and the
lighter ones δ
8
. In the plot, all points on the dotted lines belong to
RRD(0).
Figure 2 plots an achievable RCI and RRD by choosing Q in
(3) and (4) to be the optimal jointly Gaussian choice (jointly
Gaussian with X,Y ); i.e, the optimal RCI is at least as much
as shown and the optimal RRD is at most what is shown. Note
that RCI = 0 when R = 0 consistent with Corollary 2.2, but
RCI is strictly positive for all R > 0.
Example 2.2: A binary example. Figure 3 shows the joint
p.m.f. of a pair of dependent binary random variables U, V .
The boundary of the rate region RRD(0) is plotted in Figure 3.
This is the optimal trade-off of rates at which the genie can
communicate with the observers so that they may produce a
common random variable which can render their observations
practically conditionally independent.
Example 2.3: Figure 4 shows the joint p.m.f. of a pair of
dependent random variables X,Y . When δ = 0, they have the
simple dependency structure of X = (X ′, Q), Y = (Y ′, Q)
where X ′, Y ′, Q are independent. This is the trivial case in the
introduction, and the observers can each produce, without any
assistance from the genie, Q which renders their observations
conditionally independent. Thus, RRD(0) is the entire positive
quadrant. For small values of δ we intuitively expect the
random variables to be “close” to this case. A measure such
as the common information of Ga´cs and Ko¨rner fails to bring
this out (common information is discontinuous in δ jumping
from H(Q) = 1 at δ = 0 to 0 for δ > 0). However, the
intuition is borne out by our trade-off regions. For instance,
for δ = 0.05, Figure 4 shows that RRD(0) is nearly all of the
positive quadrant.
In Section III, we will use the characterization developed in
this section to compare the pairs of random variables in the last
two examples in a cryptographic context. See Example 3.1.
E. Relationship between RCI and RRD
The residual dependency rate-region can be written in terms
of the common information rate-region: (proof is omitted due
to space constraints)
Corollary 2.4:
RRD(RRD) = {(R1, R2) : ∃(r1, r2) ∈ δRCI(rCI) s.t. rCI ≥
I(X;Y )−RRD + r1 + r2, R1 ≥ r1, and R2 ≥ r2},
where
δRCI(RCI) = {(R1, R2) ∈ RCI(RCI) : 6 ∃(r1, r2) ∈ RCI(RCI)
s.t. r1 ≤ R1, r2 ≤ R2, and (r1, r2) 6= (R1, R2)}.
F. Sketch of Proof of Theorem 2.1
Proof of achievability (R? ⊇ R), which is based on Wyner-
Ziv’s source coding with side-information [20], is omitted in
the interest of space. The cardinality bound can be shown
using Carathe´odory’s theorem.
To prove the converse, let  > 0 and n, f1, f2, g1, g2 be such
that (1) and (2) hold. Let Ck = fk(Xn, Y n), for k = 1, 2, and
W1 = g1(X
n, C1) and W2 = g2(Y n, C2). Then,
R1 +  ≥ 1
n
H(C1) ≥ 1
n
H(C1|Xn) ≥ 1
n
H(W1|Xn)
≥ 1
n
I(Y n;W1|Xn)
(a)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Xi)−H(Yi|Y i−1, Xn,W1)
≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Xi)−H(Yi|Xi,W1, Y i−1, Xi−1)
=
n∑
i=1
1
n
I(Yi;Qi|Xi), Qi := (W1, Y i−1, Xi−1)
(b)
= I(YJ ;QJ |XJ , J) (c)= I(YJ ;Q|XJ), Q := (QJ , J),
where (a) follows from the independence of (Xi, Yi) pairs
across i. In (b), we define J to be a random variable uniformly
distributed over {1, . . . , n} and independent of (Xn, Y n).
And (c) follows from the independence of J and (Xn, Y n).
Similarly,
R2 +  ≥ 1
n
H(C2|Y n) ≥ 1
n
H(W2|Y n)
≥ 1
n
H(W1|Xn)− 1
n
H(W2|W1)
(a)
≥ H(W1|Xn)− κ
≥ 1
n
I(Xn;W1|Y n)− κ
(b)
≥ I(XJ ;Q|YJ)− κ,
where (a) (with κ := 1 + log |X ||Y|) follows from Fano’s
inequality and the fact that the range of g1 can be restricted
without loss of generality to a set of cardinality |X |n|Y|n.
And (b) can be shown along the same lines as the chain
of inequalities which gave a lower bound for R1 above.
Moreover,
1
n
I(Xn, Y n;W1) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Xi, Yi)−H(Xi, Yi|W1, Xi−1, Y i−1)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi, Yi;Qi)
= I(XJ , YJ ;Q).
Since XJ , YJ has the same joint distribution as X,Y , the
converse (RCI ⊆ R?CI) for common information follows. Sim-
ilarly, the converse (RRD ⊆ R?RD) for residual dependency
can be shown using
1
n
I(Xn;Y n|W1) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
n|W1, Xi−1)
≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|W1, Xi−1, Y i−1)
= I(XJ ;YJ |Q).
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPLICATION
A. Background
Secure multi-party computation is a central problem in
modern cryptography. Roughly, the goal of secure multi-party
computation is to carry out computations on inputs distributed
among two (or more) parties, so as to provide each of them
with no more information than what their respective inputs
and outputs reveal to them. Our focus in this section is on
an important sub-class of such problems — which we shall
call secure 2-party sampling — in which the computation has
no inputs, but the outputs to the parties are required to be
from a given joint distribution (and each party should not
learn anything more than its part of the output). Also we shall
restrict ourselves to the case of honest-but-curious adversaries.
It is well-known (see for instance [18] and references therein)
that very few distributions can be sampled from in this way,
unless the computation is aided by a set up — some correlated
random variables that are given to the parties at the beginning
of the protocol. The set up itself will be from some distribution
(X,Y ) (Alice gets X and Bob gets Y ) which is different
from the desired distribution (U, V ) (Alice getting U and Bob
getting V ). The fundamental question then is, which set ups
(X,Y ) can be used to securely sample which distributions
(U, V ), and how efficiently.
While the feasibility question can be answered using com-
binatorial analysis (as, for instance, was done in [12]), in-
formation theoretic tools have been put to good use to show
bounds on efficiency of protocols (e.g. [2], [5], [15], [10],
[17], [7], [4], [14]). Our work continues on this vein of
using information theory to formulate and answer efficiency
questions in cryptography. Specifically, the quantities explored
in the previous section lead to effective tools in providing new
and improved upper-bounds on the rate at which samples from
a distribution (U, V ) can be securely generated, per sample
drawn from a set up distribution (X,Y ). Below we sketch the
outline of this application, which is further developed in [13].
a) Secure Protocols: A two-party protocol Π is specified
by a pair of (possibly randomized) functions piAlice and piBob,
that are used by each party to operate on its current state W
to produce a message m (that is sent to the other party) and
a new state W ′ for itself. The initial state of the parties may
consist of correlated random variables (X,Y ), with Alice’s
state being X and Bob’s state being Y ; such a pair is
called a set up for the protocol. The protocol proceeds by
the parties taking turns to apply their respective functions to
their state, and sending the resulting message to the other
party; this message is added to the state of the other party.
piAlice and piBob also specify when the protocol terminates
and produces output (instead of producing the next message
in the protocol). A protocol is considered valid only if both
parties terminate in a finite number of rounds (with probability
1). The view of a party in an execution of the protocol is
a random variable which is defined as the collection of its
states so far in the protocol execution. For a valid protocol
Π = (piAlice, piBob), we shall denote the final views of the two
parties as (ΠviewAlice(X,Y ),Π
view
Bob (X,Y )). Also, we shall denote
the outputs as (ΠoutAlice(X,Y ),Π
out
Bob(X,Y )).
For a protocol Π to be a secure realization of (U, V ) given a
set up (X,Y ), firstly, the outputs (ΠoutAlice(X,Y ),Π
out
Bob(X,Y ))
must be identically distributed as (U, V ). Secondly, if either
Alice or Bob is “curious” (or “passively corrupt”), the protocol
should give that party no more information about the other
party’s output than what their own output provides. This
is formalized using a simulatability requirement. In case of
information theoretic security (as opposed to computational
security) these can be stated in terms of independence of the
view, given one’s own output. Formally these three require-
ments can be stated as follows:4
(ΠoutAlice(X,Y ),Π
out
Bob(X,Y )) = (U, V )
ΠviewAlice(X,Y )↔ ΠoutAlice(X,Y )↔ ΠoutBob(X,Y )
ΠoutAlice(X,Y )↔ ΠoutBob(X,Y )↔ ΠviewBob (X,Y )
B. Towards Measuring Cryptographic Content
In [17] three information theoretic quantities were used
to quantify the cryptographic content of a pair of correlated
random variables X and Y , which we shall rephrase as below:
H(Y ↘ X|X) = min
Q:H(Q|Y )=I(X;Y |Q)=0
H(Q|X)
H(X ↘ Y |Y ) = min
Q:H(Q|X)=I(X;Y |Q)=0
H(Q|Y )
I(X;Y |X ∧ Y ) = min
Q:H(Q|X)=H(Q|Y )=0
I(X;Y |Q)
As shown in [17], these quantities are “monotones” that
can only decrease in a protocol, and if the protocol securely
realizes a pair of correlated random variables (U, V ) using a
set up (X,Y ), then each of these quantities should be at least
as large for (X,Y ) as for (U, V ). While these quantities do
capture several interesting cryptographic properties, they paint
a partial picture. For instance, two pairs of correlated random
variables (X,Y ) and (X ′, Y ′) may have vastly different values
for these quantities, even if they are statistically close to each
other, and hence have similar “cryptographic content.”
Instead, we shall consider the triplet K[X;Y |Q] defined as
K[X;Y |Q] := (I(Q;Y |X), I(Q;X|Y ), I(X;Y |Q)),
4For simplicity, we state the conditions for “perfect security.” Our defini-
tions and results generalize to the setting of “statistical security,” where a
small statistical error is allowed.
for an arbitrary random variable Q. By considering all random
variables Q we define the region5
K(X;Y ) := {(x, y, z) : ∃Q s.t. K[X;Y |Q] ≤ (x, y, z)}.
This generalizes the three quantities considered in [17], as
(using arguments similar to that used for Corollary 2.2) it can
be shown that the region K(X;Y ) ⊆ R+3 intersects the co-
ordinate axes at the points (H(Y ↘ X|X), 0, 0), (0, H(X ↘
Y |Y ), 0), and (0, 0, I(X;Y |X ∧Y ). In the following sections
we point out that K also satisfies a monotonicity property:
the region can only expand in a protocol, and if the protocol
securely realizes a pair of correlated random variables (U, V )
using a set up (X,Y ), then K(X;Y ) should be smaller than
K(U ;V ). As we shall see, since the region K(X;Y ) has a
non-trivial shape (see for instance, Example 2.2), K can yield
much better bounds on the rate than just considering the axis
intercepts; in particular K can differentiate between pairs of
correlated random variables that have the same axis intercepts.
Further K(X;Y ) is continuous as a function of (X,Y ), and
as such one can derive bounds on rate that are applicable to
statistical security as well as perfect security.
C. Monotone Regions for 2-Party Secure Protocols
Given a pair of random variables (X,Y ) denoting the views
of the two parties in a 2-party protocol we are interested in
capturing the “cryptographic content” of this pair. We shall
do so by defining a region in multi-dimensional real space,
that intuitively, consists of witnesses of “weakness” in the
cryptographic nature of the random variables (X,Y ); thus
smaller this region, the more cryptographically useful the
variables are. The region has a monotonicity property: a secure
protocol that involves only communication (over noiseless
links) and local computations (i.e., without using trusted third
parties) can only enlarge the region.
Our definition of a monotone region from [13] given below,
strictly generalizes that suggested by [17]. The monotone in
[17], which is a single real number m, can be interpreted as
a one-dimensional region [m,∞) to fit our definition. (Note
that a decrease in the value of m corresponds to the region
[m,∞) enlarging.)
Definition 3.1: We will call a function M that maps a pair
of random variables X and Y , to an upward closed subset6 of
R+d (points in the d-dimensional real space with non-negative
co-ordinates) a monotone region if it satisfies the following
properties:
1) (Local computation cannot shrink it.) For all random
variables (X,Y, Z) with X ↔ Y ↔ Z, we have
M(XY ;Z) ⊇M(Y ;Z) and M(X;Y Z) ⊇M(X;Y ).
2) (Communication cannot shrink it.) For all random vari-
ables (X,Y ) and functions f (over the support of
5Here ≤ stands for coordinate-wise comparison. Note that K(X;Y ) is
equivalent to {(R?RD(RRD), RRD) : RRD ∈ [0, I(X;Y )]}. We use this
notation to make the dependence on X and Y explicit.
6A subset M of Rd is called upward closed if a ∈ M and a′ ≥ a (i.e.,
each co-ordinate of a′ is no less than that of a) implies that a′ ∈ M.
X or Y ), we have M(X;Y f(X)) ⊇ M(X;Y ) and
M(Xf(Y );Y ) ⊇M(X;Y ).
3) (Securely derived outputs do not have smaller regions.)
For all random variables (X,U, V, Y ) with X ↔
U ↔ V and U ↔ V ↔ Y , we have M(U ;V ) ⊇
M(XU ;Y V ).
4) (Cryptographic content in independent pairs add up.)
For independent pairs of random variables (X0, Y0) and
(X1, Y1), we have M(X0X1;Y0Y1) = M(X0;Y0) +
M(X1;Y1), where the + sign denotes Minkowski sum.
That is, M(X0X1;Y0Y1) = {a0 + a1 | a0 ∈
M(X0;Y0) and a1 ∈ M(X1;Y1)}. (Here addition de-
notes coordinate-wise addition.)
Note that since M(X0;Y0) and M(X1;Y1) have non-negative
co-ordinates and are upward closed, M(X0;Y0) +M(X1;Y1)
is smaller than both of them. This is consistent with the
intuition that more cryptographic content (as would be the case
with having more independent copies of the random variables)
corresponds to a smaller region.
D. K as a Monotone Region.
In [13] we prove the theorem below, and obtain the follow-
ing corollary.
Theorem 3.1: K is a monotone region as defined in Defi-
nition 3.1.
Corollary 3.2: If n1 independent copies of a pair of corre-
lated random variables (U, V ) can be securely realized from
n2 independent copies of a pair of correlated random variables
(X,Y ), then n1K(X;Y ) ⊆ n2K(U ;V ). (Here multiplication
by an integer n refers to n-times repeated Minkowski sum.)
Intuitively, K(X;Y ) captures the cryptographic content
of the correlated random variables (X,Y ): the farther it is
from the origin, the more cryptographic content it has. In
particular, if K(X;Y ) contains the origin, then (X,Y ) is
cryptographically “trivial,” in the sense that (X,Y ) can be
securely realized with no set ups. This triviality property can
be inferred from the three quantities considered by [17] as
well, since those quantities correspond to the axis intercepts
of our monotone region. However, what makes the monotone
region more interesting is when the pair of correlated random
variables is non-trivial, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.1: Consider the question of securely realizing
n1 independent pairs of random variables distributed according
to (U, V ) in Example 2.2 from n2 independent pairs of (X,Y )
in Example 2.3. While the monotones in [17] will give a lower-
bound of 0.5182 on n2/n1, we show that n2/n1 ≥ 1.8161.
(For this we use the intersection of K(U ;V ) with the plane
z = 0 (Figure 3) and one point in the region K(X;Y ) (marked
in Figure 4), and apply Corollary 3.2.)
Hence, the axis intercepts of this monotone region (one of
which is the common information of Ga´cs and Ko¨rner) do not
by themselves capture subtle characteristics of correlation that
are reflected in the shape of the monotone region. As discussed
in [13], K(X;Y ) is a convex region, and for a fixed set of
axis intercepts, the cryptographic quality of a pair of random
variables is reflected in how little it bulges towards the origin.
We leave as an open question whether our bound is indeed
tight.
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